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INTENTIONAL GROUNDING: FIELD
QUALITY IN THE NFL AND THE LEGAL
RAMIFICATIONS FOR CHOICE OF
PLAYING SURFACES
JENNIFER SIMILE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Week thirteen of the 2011 National Football League (NFL)
season played host to some highly anticipated matchups.1 With the
8-3 Houston Texans and the 7-4 Atlanta Falcons both vying for a
playoff spot, the matchup between the two teams was one of the
week’s marquee games.2 The Texans came away as the victors on
the field with a 17-10 win, and while many predicted a big win to
take place at Reliant Stadium, few could have foreseen that a
Texan would fall victim to the field itself.3
Former Houston Texans punter Brett Hartmann suffered a
career-ending injury on December 4, 2011 when Hartmann’s foot
got caught in a seam between two pieces of sod at Reliant
*Jennifer Simile is a student at American University Washington College of
Law and a graduate of the University of Chicago. She is originally from
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Jennifer would like to thank the staff of the JOHN
MARSHALL LAW REVIEW for all of their hard work. She would also like to
thank Professor N. Jeremi Duru for all of his encouragement and guidance.
Finally, Jennifer would like to thank her student editor Mohammad
Nilforoush for helping develop her article.
1. See 2011 NFL Power Rankings: Week 13, ESPN, Nov. 29, 2011,
http://espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/tag/_/name/2011-week-13-nfl-power-rankings
(last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (providing weekly rankings of all thirty-two NFL
teams from ESPN’s NFL reporters and noting several games during week
thirteen between highly ranked teams).
2. See Robert Ferringo, 2011 NFL Power Rankings for Week 13,
BLEACHER REPORT, Nov. 30, 2011, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/9622782011-nfl-power-rankings-week-13 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (ranking NFL
teams based upon their performance during games in previous weeks).
3. See Anna-Megan Raley, Texans Players Say Field Not Up To Par, CBS
HOUSTON, Dec. 4, 2011,
http://houston.cbslocal.com/2011/12/04/texansplayers-say-field-not-up-to-par/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (describing how a
field defect caused Brett Hartmann to sustain several injuries); Jake Westrich,
2011 NFL Week 13 Picks: Falcons-Texans a Virtual Coin Toss, BLEACHER
REPORT, Nov. 29, 2011, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/961511-2011-nflweek-13-picks-falcons-texans-a-virtual-coin-toss (last visited Oct. 20,
2013)(predicting that the Texans would win); Alfie Crow, NFL Picks And
Predictions Week 13: Falcons Vs. Texans, SB NATION, Dec. 2, 2011,
http://www.sbnation.com/2011/12/2/2604537/texans-vs-falcons-2011-nfl-pickspredictions-week-13 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)(providing game predictions).
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Stadium.4 Knee injuries, though not uncommon for professional
football players, are extremely rare for punters, and even rarer
during plays where no physical contact is made.5 Hartmann is
suing the Harris County Convention & Sports Corporation
(HCCSC), as the owner of Reliant Stadium, as well as SMG, the
venue management company responsible for operating and
managing the stadium.6
The defendants, as owners and possessors of Reliant Stadium,
have a duty to prevent unreasonable risk of harm to players and to
provide them with reasonably safe playing surfaces.7 Hartmann’s
unfortunate injury illuminates the issue of unsafe playing
conditions.8 Injuries such as these are a central consideration in
the evaluation of each NFL season and are a hot-button issue for
the long-term future and viability of the National Football League
as a whole.9 Specifically, the number of injuries football players
sustain due to poor playing surfaces has been on the rise.10 For
example, New England Patriots Coach Bill Belichick blamed
horrible turf for knocking star wide receiver Wes Welker out of the
2010 season after he tore multiple ligaments in his knee during a

4. See Ex-Texans Punter Sues Stadium Tenant, FOX SPORTS, Nov. 15,
2012,
http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/story/brett-hartmann-former-houstontexans-punter-sues-stadium-tenant-unsafe-turf-knee-injury-111512
(last
visited Nov. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Ex-Texans Punter Sues] (describing the
manner in which workers piece the field together using over a thousand
interconnected palettes).
5. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Request for Disclosures at 3, Brett
Hartmann v. SMG and Harris Cnty. Convention & Sports Corp., No. 201267930 (Tex. Dist. Nov. 15, 2012), 2012 WL 5662899 [hereinafter
Hartmann](alleging that Hartmann’s injury arose from atypical
circumstances); State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d
235, 237 (Tex.1992) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN.
§ 101.022(b)) (“That duty requires an owner to use ordinary care to reduce or
eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition of
which the owner is or reasonably should be aware.”).
6. Id.
7. See id. (asserting that defendants were in control of and maintained
the football field at Reliant Stadium).
8. See Raley, supra note 3 (illustrating that Hartmann was injured
because of poor field quality at Reliant Stadium).
9. See Scott Kacsmar, Are NFL Player Injuries Up, or Has Reporting Just
Improved?, BLEACHER REPORT, Aug. 14, 2012,
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1296733-are-nfl-player-injuries-up-or-hasreporting-just-improved (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (disclosing that injuries
have decisive impacts on how each NFL team’s season unfolds).
10. See id. (detailing different types of injuries and finding that the total
injuries reported from the 2010 season to the 2011 season increased); Michael
Lombardi, Washington Redskins Must Improve FedEx Field Playing Surface,
NFL, Jan. 8, 2013,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000123832/article/washingtowredskins-must-improve-fedex-field-playing-surface (last visited Jan. 29, 2013)
(opining that poor field quality led to Robert Griffin III’s knee injury).
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game at Reliant Stadium.11 Additionally, many blame the poor
field quality at FedEx Field for the severe knee damage superstar
quarterback Robert Griffin III (RGIII) sustained during his 2012
rookie season, which simultaneously ended both his season and
the Washington Redskins’ playoff hopes.12 Due to increasing
awareness of these injury trends and knowledge of the dangers
which may be caused by poor field quality, the NFL’s choice of
playing surfaces could have significant legal ramifications.13
The NFL is an unincorporated association that includes
thirty-two separately owned football teams, each with its own
name, logo, colors, and mascot.14 Despite being separately owned,
the teams have integrated their operations, cooperate for a
common purpose, and work toward common interests.15 The NFL’s
revenue for the 2011-12 season was approximately $9.5 billion.16
The NFL has tripled its revenue over the past seventeen years and
aims to reach $25 billion in revenue by 2027.17 As such, the NFL is
11. See Mike Florio, Belichick Blames Welker Injury on Reliant Stadium
Turf, NBC SPORTS, Jan. 4, 2010,
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/01/04/belichick-blames-welkerinjury-on-reliant-stadium-turf/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (providing
statements Belichick made to a radio station claiming Reliant Stadium is one
of the worst playing surfaces in the NFL); Ryan Christopher DeVault, Wes
Welker Injury Update: Season Over for New England Patriots Receiver,
YAHOO, Jan. 4, 2010, http://voices.yahoo.com/wes-welker-injury-updateseason-over-england-5201733.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)(stating Welker’s
2010 season ended due to a knee injury).
12. See Lombardi, supra note 10 (detailing the deplorable conditions at
FedEx Field when RGIII was injured); Gary Davenport, A Complete Timeline
of RG3’s Injury: What Went Wrong for Redskins QB?, BLEACHER REPORT, Jan.
6, 2013,
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1473246-a-complete-timeline-ofrg3s-injury-what-went-wrong-for-redskins-qb (arguing that on the play in
which RGIII’s knee buckled, the Redskins’ season ended for all intents and
purposes).
13. See Suneal Bedi, From Pigskin to Bacon: The Legal Issues Surrounding
May
8,
2012,
the
NFL’s
Concussion
Litigation,
FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/05/08/from-pigskin-to-bacon-thelegal-issues-surrounding-the-nfls-concussion-litigation (last visited Jan, 25,
2013)(explaining that once dangers are known to the NFL, an affirmative duty
to protect football players may develop).
14. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010) (discussing
the independent business of the thirty-two teams of the NFL and the corporate
entity formed to manage the intellectual property for all the teams).
15. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941,
943 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (illustrating that all thirty-two NFL teams collectively
licensed their intellectual property).
16. See Cork Gaines, Sports Chart of the Day: NFL Revenue is Nearly 25%
INSIDER,
Oct.
9,
2012,
More
Than
MLB,
BUSINESS
http://www.businessinsider.com/sports-chart-of-the-day-nfl-revenue-stilldwarfs-other-major-sports-2012-10 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013)(providing
charts comparing the amount of revenue the most popular professional sports
brought in during the 2012 season).
17. See Daniel Kaplan, Goodell Sets Revenue Goal of $ 25B by 2027 for
JOURNAL,
Apr.
5,
2010,
NFL,
SPORTSBUSINESS
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a very profitable business; however, premises liability lawsuits
could significantly drain its finances.18
This Comment analyzes whether the NFL could be held liable
for injuries players sustain as a result of poor field quality and
unsafe working conditions. Part II provides a brief history of Brett
Hartmann’s football career and discusses the playing surface at
Reliant Stadium. This section also provides a background of the
legal provisions relevant to sports-related injuries. Part III
analyzes the applicability of relevant laws, including safe place
statutes and the open and obvious doctrine. Additionally, Part III
considers whether the NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement
would prevent lawsuits based upon field quality. Part IV provides
recommendations for how the NFL, teams, and players should
handle field quality issues. Part IV asserts that based upon
concussion litigation, the NFL must take affirmative steps to
protect the safety of players now that the dangers of playing
surfaces are known. Additionally, Part IV warns that studies have
found artificial turf to be dangerous for players, and recommends
that grass should be preferred over turf to make the game safer.
Part V concludes that the NFL should mandate full-field grass as
the safest playing surface.
II. REVIEWING THE TAPES: THE END OF A FOOTBALL
CAREER, UNSAFE TURK AND EXISTING DOCTRINE
A. The Story of Brett Hartmann
Brett Hartmann, a former Houston Texans punter, has sued
the operators of Reliant Stadium in Houston, Texas, blaming
“unsafe turf” for the knee injury that likely ended his football
career. On December 4, 2011, Hartmann tore his left anterior
cruciate ligament (ACL) and fractured a bone during Houston’s
game against Atlanta.19 Hartmann was punting in the fourth
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2010/04/20100405/ThisWeeks-News/Goodell-Sets-Revenue-Goal-Of-$25B-By-2027-For-NFL.aspx (last
visited Jan. 25, 2013) (claiming that to reach the goal of $25 billion in revenue
by 2027, the NFL would need to add nearly $1 billion in new revenue on
average each year until then).
18. See
Lawyers
for
Civil
Justice
et
al.,
Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies, 2010,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/L
ibrary/Litigation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Companies.pdf
[hereinafter Litigation Cost Survey]. But see Ken Belson, Concussion Liability
Costs May Rise, and Not Just for NFL, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/sports/football/insurance-liability-in-nflconcussion-suits-may-have-costly-consequences.html?pagewanted=all
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2013) (showing that legal expenses are extremely costly and
have a huge effect on insurance, but that the NFL may be equipped to handle
these legal challenges).
19. See id. (asserting that Brett Hartmann was injured when he caught his
left foot in a seam between trays of grass at Reliant Stadium).
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quarter when his left foot caught in one of the seams between the
squares of grass that make up the playing surface, causing him to
tumble to the turf.20 Video of the injury shows quite conclusively
that Hartmann’s foot got caught on the playing turf and that
Hartman made no physical contact with any other player.21
Rather than letting the grass grow on the field in one “piece”
as it does at most other NFL stadiums which utilize grass, the
playing surface at Reliant Stadium is transported into the stadium
in 8-by-8 foot pieces known as “trays.”22 Workers at the stadium
piece together more than 1,200 8-by-8 foot palettes of real grass
with forklifts, leading to innumerable seams and uneven
partitions.23 Although the turf is inspected by stadium officials and
NFL referees before every Texans game, the system is not perfect,
as evidenced by Hartmann’s foot getting caught in a seam between
two squares of sod, causing extensive damage to his knee.24
Hartmann has required multiple surgeries and will likely need
more, rendering his career effectively over.25
On November 15, 2012, Hartmann filed a lawsuit in Harris
County District Court, naming stadium owner HCCSC and venuemanagement company SMG as defendants.26 Hartmann alleges
that the Defendants knew that the use of “trays” causes continuity
problems such as gaps, seams, indentations, and lifted areas,
creating hazards to players.27 Additionally, Hartmann alleges that
several other players suffered serious injuries attributable solely
to the field.28 The NFL is not currently a defendant in this

20. See Barry Petchesky, Former Texans Punter Suing Reliant Stadium
Owners For Being Injured By Its Crappy Field, DEADSPIN, Nov. 15, 2012,
http://deadspin.com/brett-hartmann/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (recounting
Brett Hartmann’s injury and revealing that doctors discovered a fractured
fibula and completely torn ACL).
21. See Raley, supra note 3 (clarifying that punter Brett Hartmann was
injured without being touched); see also, Plaintiff’s Original Petition and
Request for Disclosures, supra note 5, at 3 (asserting that video of the injury
Hartmann sustained shows conclusively that his foot got caught in a seam of
the sod).
22. See Petchesky, supra note 20 (describing the procedure utilized at
Reliant Stadium to construct the playing surface out of grass trays).
23. See Ex-Texans Punter Sues, supra note 4 (explaining the method
Reliant Stadium workers use to construct the playing surface).
24. See id. (remarking that Brett Hartmann’s knee injury was so extensive
that it likely ended his career).
25. See Petchesky, supra note 20 (detailing the extent of Brett Hartmann’s
knee injury, how he was placed on the injured reserve, and eventually cut by
the Texans).
26. Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Request for Disclosures, supra note 5,
at 1.
27. See id. at 4 (contending that the surface at Reliant Stadium is unsafe
and unsuitable in that it has innumerable seams and uneven partitions).
28. See id. at 5 (announcing that other players such as New England
Patriots wide receiver Wes Welker suffered serious knee injuries at Reliant
Stadium).
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lawsuit.29 However, when conflicts arise between the players and
the NFL, they are governed by a collective bargaining
agreement.30
B. Collective Bargaining Agreement
The NFL and the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) reached
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on August 4, 2011.31 The
current CBA is controlling until 2020.32 The agreement covers
topics such as lockouts, lawsuits, player contracts, and various
other subjects.33 Representing the complete understanding of the
parties on all subjects covered therein, the CBA cannot be changed
without mutual consent.34
Article 44 covers injury grievances. Injury grievances are
claims or complaints that, at the time a player’s NFL Player
Contract was terminated by a Club, “the player was physically
unable to perform the services required of him by that contract
because an injury incurred in the performance of his services
under that contract.”35 These grievances are to be heard before a
panel of arbitrators.36 Alternatively, Article 45 covers injury
protection, which is a benefit for which the player must first
qualify.37
Article 3, which covers lawsuits, states:
The NFLPA agrees that neither it nor any of its members, nor
agents acting on its behalf, nor any member of its bargaining unit,
will sue, or support financially or administratively, or voluntarily
provide testimony or affidavit in, any suit against the NFL or any
Club with respect to any claim relating to any conduct permitted by

29. See id. at 1 (indicating that the NFL is not listed as a defendant in the
lawsuit).
30. See generally NFL & NFL Players Ass’n, NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement
2011-2020,
available
at
http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement2011-2020.pdf [hereinafter NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement] (providing
the contract between the NFL and the NFLPA which covers a wide range of
topics).
31. See id. at xiv (providing the time frame when the contract became
binding).
32. See id. at art. 1 (establishing that the agreement is binding for ten
seasons).
33. See generally id. (providing a range of topics upon which the NFL and
NFLPA agreed).
34. See id. at art. 2, § 4 (clarifying that both the NFL and the NFLPA must
agree upon any modifications and that they waive all rights to bargain with
one another concerning any subject for the agreement’s duration).
35. Id. at art. 44, § 1.
36. See id. at art. 44, §§ 6-7 (advising that injury grievances are to be
handled through arbitration instead of the court system).
37. See id. at art. 45, § 1 (defining injury protection and explaining how a
professional football player can meet the requirements necessary to qualify for
this benefit).
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this Agreement, or any term of this Agreement.38

Case law suggests that for issues where the CBA is silent, a
litigant’s recovery is not limited by the agreement.39 For example,
claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation often associated
with staph infections are not explicitly delineated in the CBA.40 In
Bentley v. Cleveland Browns, the Court of Appeals of Ohio
considered whether LeCharles Bentley’s claims of negligent
misrepresentation arising from a staph infection were governed by
the CBA, and ultimately concluded that Bentley’s claims did not
implicate or contravene the CBA.41 Similarly, in Jurevicius v.
Cleveland Browns, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio held that Jurevicius’ claims that he
contracted a staph infection through fraud and negligent
misrepresentation neither arose from nor required the
interpretation of the CBA to determine their outcomes.42
The CBA was made in accordance with the provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act.43 Under this Act, the National
Labor Relations Board carries out its functions under the Labor
Management Relations Act.44 The Labor Management Relations
Act aims to promote commerce by prescribing the proper relations
between employees and employers.45 The Act seeks to safeguard
the rights of individual employees and the public at large to
promote general welfare in connection with labor organizations,
labor management, and labor disputes which affect commerce.46
38. Id. at art. 3, § 2.
39. See Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 958 N.E.2d 585, 588
(Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (holding that state law would be applied where issues
were not agreed upon in the CBA); Jurevicius v. Cleveland Browns Football
Co. LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144096, *48 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010)
(reasoning that issues not outlined in the CBA are not preempted by the
LMRA).
40. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30
(lacking terms pertaining to negligent misrepresentation).
41. See Bentley, 958 N.E.2d at 588 (holding that negligent
misrepresentation was not agreed to in the CBA).
42. See Jurevicius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144096, at *48 (finding the CBA
was not implicated).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2011) (declaring it to be the policy of the U.S. to
eliminate certain obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstacles by encouraging collective bargaining and by
protecting workers’ ability to negotiate the terms and conditions of their
employment).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2011) (asserting that conflicts which interfere with
the normal flow of commerce and with the full production of articles and
commodities can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers,
employees, and unions each recognize under law one another’s legitimate
rights in their relations with each other).
45. See id. (claiming that conflicts which interfere with commerce can be
avoided or substantially minimized if all parties recognize and adhere to the
law).
46. Id.
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C. Field Regulations and Grass Alternatives
The NFL Game Operations Manual has certain guidelines
pertaining to playing surfaces.47 Within seventy-two hours of each
home game, clubs must certify that their fields are in compliance
with the guidelines.48 Fields must pass an impact hardness test,
synthetic infill depth and evenness test, and a visual inspection.49
These regulations are designed to help keep players safe.
Many clubs prefer to have artificial playing surfaces rather
than natural grass.50 According to scientific studies, artificial turf
can cause more injuries to players than natural grass.51 Given the
dangers of artificial turf, an NFL team may be held negligent for
choosing this playing surface.52
There are various playing surfaces a stadium could install.53
Studies have shown that certain serious knee and ankle injuries
happen more often in games played on artificial turf than on
natural grass.54 A report examining the 2002-08 NFL seasons
compared games played on grass to those played on FieldTurf, the
most popular brand of artificial turf.55 It found that the rate of
ACL injuries was 88 percent higher in FieldTurf games.56 The risk
of injury associated with different playing surfaces is a significant
consideration in choosing a field because player safety is extremely
47. See Jarrett Bell, NFLPA wants FedEx Field’s playing surface improved,
USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/redskins/2013/01/09/nflnf-fedexfield-conditions/1821311 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (summarizing portions of
the NFL Game Operations Manual which outline tests to ensure playing
surfaces are safe).
48. See id. (describing how all clubs must be in compliance with the
Recommended Practices for the Maintenance of Infill and Natural Surfaces for
NFL Games).
49. See id. (explaining that failure to comply with the tests is considered
both a competitive and player safety issue and will be subject to disciplinary
action by the Commissioner’s office).
50. See Dave Richard, The Significance of Field Surface, CBS SPORTS, June
25, 2009, http://fantasynews.cbssports.com/fantasyfootball/story/11892841
(last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (demonstrating that fourteen teams use artificial
turf).
51. See Panel: Knee, Ankle Injury Higher on Turf, ESPN, Mar. 12, 2010,
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4988136 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012)
[hereinafter Panel] (describing how certain serious knee and ankle injuries
happen more often on the most popular brand of artificial turf than on grass).
52. See Bedi, supra note 13 (suggesting that once dangers are known, a
duty to protect players may develop and that ignoring this duty could be
negligent).
53. See Richard, supra note 50 (listing several types of both natural and
artificial playing surfaces).
54. See Panel, supra note 51 (denoting that serious knee and ankle injuries
happen more often on FieldTurf).
55. See id. (asserting that most stadiums utilizing artificial surfaces use
FieldTurf, a next-generation turf).
56. See id. (studying the rate of certain serious ankle and knee injuries
sustained by professional football players in the NFL).
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important.57
D. Safe Place Statutes
There are many state safe place statutes which require that
employers provide a safe workplace for employees.58 Nearly all
jurisdictions utilize safe place statutes which are quite similar in
that they place a higher threshold of liability on property owners.59
Wisconsin and Ohio are illustrative of the safe place statutes.60
Wisconsin’s safe place statute dictates that employers must
provide “methods and processes reasonably adequate to render
such employment and places of employment safe, and shall do
every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health,
safety, and welfare of such employees and frequenters.”61 In
interpreting this statute, courts have held that it applies to both
places of employment and public buildings.62 A place of
employment is any profit-making enterprise.63
For example, in Ruppa v. American States Insurance, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an arena hosting a horse show
was under the ambit of the safe place statute such that when a
horse tripped over a defect in the arena flooring, the injured rider
was entitled to sue the arena for violating the statute.64 However,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hoepner v. City of Eau Claire
held that a municipal softball field was neither a place of
employment nor a public building and was therefore not covered
by the safe place statute, and thus the municipality could not be
liable when a softball player tripped over a defect in the field and
fractured his leg.65 The court reasoned that bringing in soil as a fill
to provide for the softball field did not constitute a “structure”

57. See Richard, supra note 50 (describing the different injuries commonly
associated with different varieties of natural and artificial playing surfaces).
58. See generally WIS. STAT. § 101.11 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4101.12 (2012) (dictating that employers must provide a safe work
environment to employees).
59. See Joshua E. Kastenberg, A Three Dimensional Model Of Stadium
Owner Liability In Spectator Injury Cases, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 187, 201
(1996) (analyzing Wisconsin’s safe place statute as it applies to sports and
entertainment).
60. See id. (explaining that most jurisdictions have very similar safe place
statutes).
61. WIS. STAT. § 101.11 (2011).
62. See Ruppa v. American States Ins. Co., 91 Wis.2d 628, 639 (Wis. 1979)
(holding that both places of employment and public buildings are subject to
the requirements of the safe place statute).
63. See id. (reasoning that any enterprise that makes a profit is a place of
employment and must comply with the safe place statute).
64. See id. at 628 (holding that the horse arena was a public place covered
by the safe place statute).
65. See generally Hoepner v. Eau Claire, 264 Wis. 608 (Wis. 1953) (finding
that the municipality did not profit from making the field available to the
public and that it was against public policy to hold it liable for injury).
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within the meaning of the term “public building.”66
Ohio’s statute is slightly different in that it places a stricter
burden on the employer by stating that “[n]o employer shall
require, permit, or suffer any employee to go or be in any
employment or place of employment which is not safe.”67 By
phrasing the statue in this fashion, Ohio is saying not only that
employers cannot require employees to work in unsafe conditions,
but that employers many not even allow employees to work in
unsafe conditions without violating the statute.68 The statute goes
on to dictate that “no such employer shall fail to furnish, provide,
and use safety devices and safeguards, or fail to obey and follow
orders or to adopt and use methods and processes reasonably
adequate to render such employment and place of employment
safe.”69 This language goes beyond prohibited actions and makes it
such that an employer would be liable for any omissions or failures
to act as well.70 Finally, the statute ends with the statement, “[n]o
employer shall fail to do every other thing reasonably necessary to
protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such employees or
frequenters. No such employer or other person shall construct,
occupy, or maintain any place of employment that is not safe.”71
Despite the range of protections that safe place statutes
provide, an employer’s liability will be abrogated under certain
circumstances.72 Case law implies that Ohio’s safe place statute
empowers the judiciary to analyze each circumstance anew when
determining statutory compliance.73 The court in Vayto v. River
Terminal & Railway Company stated that the safe place statute
was “general and declaratory, for the question as to what is a safe
place or safe employment remains for judicial determination.”74
Additionally, the judiciary will determine the “kind and character
of safety devices and safeguards to be used and the methods and
processes to be employed.”75 This gives the court broad discretion
when evaluating a possible violation of the safe place statute.76

66. See id. at 614 (limiting the definition of “public building” to premises
where materials are utilized to form a structure).
67. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.12 (2012).
68. See id. (mandating that employers must take affirmative steps to
ensure that employees are not working in unsafe conditions).
69. Id.
70. See id. (ensuring that employers actively protect employees).
71. Id.
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A (1965) (explaining that
known or obvious dangers abrogate a possessor of land’s liability).
73. See Vayto v. River T. & R. Co., 28 Ohio Dec. 401, 438 (Ohio C.P. 1915)
(determining that each situation and particular circumstances will be
analyzed independently).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. (holding that whether the statute was followed is
circumstantial).
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E. The Open and Obvious Doctrine
When a plaintiff voluntarily confronts an open and obvious
danger, his negligence is greater than the defendant’s.77 Where a
hazard is not open or obvious, the property owner or operator has
a duty to foresee the hazard and protect against it.78 For example,
the Supreme Court of New York in Patterson v. Troyer Potato
Products held that the bottom shelf in an aisle of a store was not
an open and obvious danger.79 The Louisiana Court of Appeals in
Wallace v. Howell held that the wet floor in the laundry room of an
apartment was also not an open and obvious danger.80 In both
situations, the property owner or operator had a duty to protect
against the hazard because the danger was not open and obvious.81
In regards to invitees, property owners have a duty to
maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn
invitees of the dangerous conditions of any hidden dangers.82 In
analyzing the duty of care required, the common law dictates that
property owners owe invitees ordinary or reasonable care.83
Reasonable care is defined as the degree of caution and concern for
safety that an ordinarily prudent and rational person would use in
the circumstances.84
F. Concussion Litigation May Shed Light on the Issue
Merril Hoge is one of the few former players who has
succeeded in an individual claim against the NFL for the
concussions he has sustained.85 While playing for the Bears, Hoge

77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A.
78. See id. (defining the duties associated with the open and obvious
doctrine).
79. See Patterson v. Troyer Potato Prods., 273 A.D.2d 865, 865 (N.Y. App.
Div. 4th Dep’t 2000) (reasoning that the shelf was near the floor level and was
not easily seen).
80. See Wallace v. Howell, 30 So. 3d 217, 218-19 (4th Cir. 2010) (asserting
that because the tenant had no reason to know that the laundry room flooded
when it stormed, the water was not open and obvious).
81. See id. (finding that the flooding was sudden and unexpected);
Patterson, 273 A.D.2d at 865 (concluding that hazards hidden near ground
level are not open and obvious).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A.
83. See id. (discussing the open and obvious doctrine’s requirement that
possessors of land exercise reasonable care).
84. See id. (providing illustrations of the reasonable care standard
necessary for the open and obvious doctrine); Symposium On Negligence In
The Courts: The Actual Practice: Appendix Bibliography Of State Jury
Instructions For Negligence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625 (2002) (listing the
reasonable care definition used in Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, and
Utah).
85. See Jeremy P. Gove, Three and Out: The NFL’s Concussion Liability
and How Players Can Tackle the Problem, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 649,
675 (2012) (discussing the evolution of concussion litigation).
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suffered a concussion in a preseason game against the Chiefs.86 He
played the next week after being cleared by a team doctor even
though he had trouble recalling plays.87 Six weeks after his first
concussion, Hoge suffered a second blow to the head, causing him
to retire from professional football.88 Following his retirement,
Hoge sued the Bears’ team physician for allowing Hoge to return
to the field without warning him of the dangers of returning too
soon. Ultimately, Hoge recovered a jury verdict for $1.55 million.89
Hoge also recovered an additional $1 million in a workman’s
compensation suit against the Bears and from an NFL injury
separation agreement, making his case the only successful lawsuit
by a former NFL player against the League for its
mismanagement of concussions.90
On August 14, 2007, in response to the attention football
concussions received, the NFL held a League-wide concussion
summit and disseminated new concussion guidelines.91 Knowing
the dangers associated with concussions, the League eventually
changed regulations to improve working conditions for its
players.92 In an attempt to make football safer for its players, the
League announced stricter guidelines for when a player may
return to the field following a concussion.93 In 2009, the NFL
enacted a concussion guideline supplement after an
“embarrassing” hearing before the House Judiciary Committee on
the issue of player safety.94 During the hearing, NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell refused to say whether he thought

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. (acknowledging Hoge’s judgment); Rummana Hussain, Hoge
Wins Lawsuit Against Doctor, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 22, 2002,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-07-22/sports/0007220191_1_hogeconcussions-braindamage (detailing Hoge’s lawsuit and recovery).
91. See Complaint at 135, Maxwell v. NFL, No. BC465842 (Cal. Super. Ct.
July 19, 2011) (claiming that the League recognized the danger and took
action to rectify the problem).
92. See League Announces Stricter Concussion Guidelines, NFL, Dec. 2,
2009,
http://blogs.nfl.com/2009/12/02/league-announces-stricter-concussionguidelines (last visited Nov. 25, 2012) [hereinafter League] (releasing new
return-to-play rules developed by the NFL’s medical committee on concussions
in conjunction with team doctors, outside medical experts, and the NFL
Players Association in order to provide more specificity in making return-toplay decisions).
93. See id. (expanding the rules to state that those who suffer a concussion
should not return to play or practice on the same day if the player shows any
signs or symptoms of a concussion).
94. See Alan Schwarz, NFL to Shift in Its Handling of Concussions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/sports/football/23concussion.html
(last
visited Jan. 25, 2013) (explaining that Roger Goodell was very vague during
the congressional hearing).
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the cognitive decline observed in retired players was linked with
their time in the NFL.95 Also, committee members, former players,
and even a former team executive criticized the Commissioner for
the League’s negligence in handling brain injuries in active and
former players.96
The League is facing a class-action lawsuit including over
3,000 current and former players for the NFL’s mismanagement of
concussions.97 The Master Complaint filed by these players states
that the NFL had a “duty to provide players with rules and
information to protect the players as much as possible from shortterm and long-term health risks.”98 On August 29, 2013, the
parties reached a settlement agreement which would require the
NFL to contribute $765 million to cover injury compensation for
retired players, fund medical and safety research, and pay
litigation expenses; however, the judge overseeing the proceedings
has yet to approve the proposed settlement.99
The history of concussions in the NFL demonstrates that
when player safety is compromised, the NFL has attempted to
remedy the issue.100 However, despite its promulgation of new
rules and regulations to make the game safer, the NFL has
nonetheless been criticized for knowingly putting players’ health
at risk and for not acting quickly enough to protect players’
safety.101

95. See Alan Schwarz, NFL Scolded Over Injuries to Its Players, N.Y.
TIMES, (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/sports/football/29hearing.html?scp=2&sq=
&st=nyt [hereinafter NFL Scolded] (quoting Goodell’s vague responses to
questioning).
96. See id. (listing the people who criticized the NFL at the hearing).
97. See Darren Heitner, NFL Concussion Litigation: Breaking Down the
NFL’s Persuasive Motion To Dismiss The Amended Master Complaint,
FORBES, Sept. 2, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2012/09/02/nfl-concussionlitigation-breaking-down-the-nfls-persuasive-motion-to-dismiss-the-amendedmaster-complaint (last visited Dec. 13, 2012) (explaining the arguments made
in the motion).
98. Id.
99. See Darren Heitner, Chicago Startup In Position To Revolutionize NFL
Players’ Concussion Detection And Analysis, FORBES, Nov. 17, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/11/17/chicago-startup-inposition-to-revolutionize-nfl-players-concussion-detection-and-analysis/.
100. See generally Complaint, supra note 91 (stating that the NFL created
the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee in response to the number of
concussions players sustained and explaining the evolution of how the NFL
has handled the concussions).
101. See Schwarz, supra note 94 (contending that after an embarrassing
hearing on the issue of player safety before the House Judiciary Committee,
the NFL seems to have begun to embrace the value of outside opinion).
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III. BEWARE OF THE BLITZ: EXISTING DOCTRINE
PROTECTS PLAYERS BUT THE CBA MAY BLOCK
LAWSUITS
A. The CBA Should Not Block Litigation
The current CBA covers a range of topics including player
injuries and represents the full understanding between the NFL
and the players.102 Section 44 of the CBA, which covers injury
grievances, may govern in Brett Hartmann’s case.103 Under the
CBA, Hartmann could have filed for a grievance within twentyfive days of the injury and the NFL would have handled his legal
claims through arbitration.104 A court may determine that his
injury should have been reviewed by the NFL arbitration panel as
required by the CBA.105 However, because the injury was caused
by a field defect, not a “typical” football injury, the court may
decide that the issue may be reviewed by a court in lieu of the
arbitration panel.106
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
may govern all CBAs affecting interstate commerce, thus
preempting any and all state-law claims.107 Section 301(a) of the
LMRA provides that when contracts between an employer and a
union in an industry affecting commerce are violated, an action
may be brought in the district court having jurisdiction of the
parties, without regard to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties.108
The purpose behind the preemption rule as it relates to the
LMRA is two-fold.109 First, the rule is applied to ensure that the

102. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30.
103. See id. (explaining what an injury grievance is and how a professional
football player qualifies for it).
104. See id. (discussing the procedure and requirements for filing am injury
grievance with the NFL).
105. See id. at art. 44, § 7 (explaining that an injury grievance must be
heard by an arbitration panel rather than a court).
106. See id. (remarking that when an injury is not a typical football injury
as outlined by the collective bargaining agreement a football player may not be
required to submit his injury grievance to the arbitration panel as his sole
remedy).
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012) (asserting that conflicts which interfere with
commerce can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees,
and unions each recognize one another’s legitimate legal rights).
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012) (stating which jurisdictions suits for
violations of contracts between labor organizations representing employees in
an industry affecting commerce may be brought); Samples v. Ryder Truck
Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881, 884 (11th Cir. 1985) (naming the specifications for
lawsuits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in the LMRA).
109. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994) (providing a
detailed explanation of the preemption rule of the LMRA).
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purposes of Section 301 will not be frustrated by state laws
attempting to determine questions related to the provisions of a
labor agreement.110 Second, the rule is applied to ensure that
parties do not attempt to escape their arbitration agreements by
disguising actions alleging breaches of duties assumed in CBAs as
tort suits.111 A preemption finding under Section 301 of the LMRA
is not mandated simply by the contention that employees’ state
law claims “necessarily implicate” the CBA.112 Additionally, the
mere fact that the court had to look at the CBA in order to
determine that it was silent on any issue relevant to employees’
state claims does not mean that the court had interpreted the CBA
in such a way as to trigger the preemption rule.113 When the
subject of the dispute is not the definition of contract terms, the
fact that a CBA will be consulted during state-law litigation does
not require the claim to be extinguished.114
If disputes fall under the existing CBA, the clauses within the
agreement should control.115 Injuries and the process for handling
injury claims are outlined extensively in the CBA.116 However,
field quality issues are nowhere explicitly delineated in the CBA
and because of this silence on the issue of field quality, the
courtroom is the proper venue for field quality litigation.117
Another issue not explicitly delineated in the CBA is
negligent misrepresentation.118 In Bentley v. Cleveland Browns,
the Court of Appeals of Ohio addressed whether LeCharles
Bentley’s claims were governed by the NFL’s CBA.119 In his
complaint, Bentley alleged fraud and negligent misrepresentation,
asserting that he contracted a staph infection from the Browns
rehabilitation facility after it was represented as a world class
facility.120 The court noted that while the parties agreed to
110. See id. (describing the first step of the preemption rule).
111. See id. (explaining the second step of the preemption rule).
112. See Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc. 386 F.3d 246, 256 (3rd Cir. 2004)
(reasoning that merely referring to the CBA does not preempt a claim).
113. See id. (stating that analyzing a CBA for silence on an issue does not
equate to interpretation).
114. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123 (explaining that merely consulting the
CBA does not preempt a claim).
115. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30
(dictating a wide variety of topics upon which the NFL and the NFLPA agreed
including injuries, lockouts, and lawsuits).
116. See id. at art. 44, § 7 (listing injuries covered by the agreement and the
procedure that professional football players must use in order to have their
injury grievances heard before the NFL arbitration panel).
117. See generally id. (lacking any terms or clauses pertaining to field
quality).
118. See generally id. (containing no terms or clauses pertaining to
negligent misrepresentation).
119. See Bentley, 958 N.E.2d at 588 (explaining that Bentley had to sign the
CBA as a condition of his employment with the Cleveland Browns).
120. See id. at 587 (asserting that the rehabilitation center was known to be
an unsterile environment).
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arbitrate disagreements within the scope of the CBA, parties
cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that falls outside the
scope of the agreement.121 The court determined that the claims
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation did not implicate the
CBA, and therefore state law was applied.122 Hartmann’s case is
similar to Bentley in that field quality issues are nowhere
implicated by the CBA. Therefore, Hartmann should not be
limited where field quality is not outlined in the agreement.123 As
in Bentley, where the CBA was not governing authority, state law
will be controlling, and thus safe place statutes will likely be
applied.124
Similarly, in Jurevicius v. Cleveland Browns, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that
Jurevicius’ claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation
neither arose from nor required the interpretation of the CBA.125
The court noted that there is no need to interpret the CBA to
determine the outcome of the claims because no provision of the
CBA covers these types of allegations.126 Hartmann’s case is akin
to Jurevicius because, like negligent misrepresentation, field
quality issues are not implicated by the CBA, and therefore
Hartmann should not be limited by the agreement.127 As in
Jurevicius, state law should be applied in Hartmann’s case where
issues are not outlined in the CBA.128
B. Safe Place Statutes Promise Safe Working Conditions for
Employees
Courts will likely find that the NFL, as an employer, must
furnish a place of employment which is safe for employees in order
to comply with safe place statutes.129 With over 1,200 squares of
121. See id. at 589 (claiming that negligent misrepresentation was not an
issue that players agreed to submit to arbitration).
122. See id. (holding that state law would govern and that arbitration could
not be compelled).
123. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30
(lacking any terms or clauses in the agreement which dictate standards for
field quality or mandated playing surfaces).
124. See Bentley, 958 N.E.2d at 589 (expressing that state law applies where
the CBA does not govern).
125. See Jurevicius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144096, at *48 (holding that
Jurevicius’ claims did not require interpretation of the CBA and were not
preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA).
126. See id. at *38 (finding that no language in the CBA implicates
negligent misrepresentation or fraud).
127. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30
(lacking any terms in the agreement which dictate standards for field quality).
128. See Jurevicius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144096, at *48 (remanding
claims to state court as the proper venue for issues not agreed upon in the
CBA).
129. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.12 (2012) (mandating that employers
must furnish safe places of employment to employees); WIS. STAT. § 101.11
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grass installed in the field at Reliant Stadium, there are many
potential hazards a player could face.130 The question then
becomes, how safe must a playing field be to comply with statutory
law? Because nearly all jurisdictions utilize very similar safe place
statutes, Wisconsin and Ohio will be analyzed in an effort to
answer this question.131
Wisconsin’s statute dictates that an employer must do
everything reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety,
and welfare of employees.132 This includes providing methods and
processes which render both employment and places of
employment safe.133 Because an employer must do everything
within reason for the safety of the employees and there are safer
ways to maintain a field, needlessly creating hazardous seams
would be in violation of this statute.134
Case law implies that under Wisconsin’s safe place statute,
Hartmann would likely have a successful case.135 In Ruppa v.
American States Insurance, the plaintiff was severely injured
when his horse slipped and fell during an arena show,136 much like
how Hartmann fell during a game at Reliant Stadium.137 The
plaintiff, Dr. Ruppa, claimed the injury was caused by the
defendants’ negligence in their failure to provide and maintain a
safe and suitable place for the horse show, which constituted a
breach of their duties under the Wisconsin safe-place statute.138
Similar to how the poor surface of the arena caused the horse to
slip and injure the plaintiff in Ruppa, the poor playing surface at
Reliant Stadium caused Brett Hartmann to catch his foot and tear
(2011) (mandating that employers must furnish safe places of employment to
employees).
130. See Ex-Texans Punter Sues, supra note 4 (illustrating how workers at
Reliant Stadium piece together trays of grass and commenting that the
method has been known to cause unevenness and lifted edges).
131. See Kastenberg, supra note 59, at 201 (stating that most jurisdictions
have similar safe place statutes).
132. See WIS. STAT. § 101.11 (listing employee safety requirements).
133. See id. (requiring that facilities must be kept safe for employees).
134. See Panel, supra note 51 (describing how certain serious injuries occur
more often on artificial turf than on grass).
135. See Ruppa, 91 Wis.2d at 640 (finding that where the safe place statute
is applicable, owners of a facility are liable “only for injury resulting from
structural defects and unsafe conditions associated with structure”).
Alternatively, under common law, the court found that an owner of land “owes
one lawfully on the premises a duty or ordinary care”, and it is possible that a
defective condition on the arena floor “may have constituted a breach of [the
owner’s] common law duty.” Id. at 643-44.
136. See id. at 633 (detailing how Doctor Ruppa was injured when he was
thrown from his horse).
137. See Raley, supra note 3 (explaining how punter Brett Hartmann was
injured after his foot got caught in a defect in the field surface of Reliant
Stadium).
138. See Ruppa, 91 Wis.2d at 639 (the safe place statute dictates that
employers furnish safe places of employment to employees).
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ligaments in his knee.139 The court in Ruppa held that the
plaintiff’s factual allegations stated a safe-place cause of action;
therefore, one would expect that Hartmann’s case states a valid
cause of action as well.140
In contrast, Hartmann’s case is dissimilar from Hoepner v.
City of Eau Claire, in which the court determined that the
municipal softball field was not covered by the safe place
statute.141 The court in Hoepner found that the field was neither a
business nor a place of employment because the city did not
generate any revenue from the operation of the field.142 Unlike the
field in Hoepner, Reliant Stadium and the NFL profit from
professional football games. Therefore, Reliant Stadium would fall
under the provisions of the safe place statute.143
Ohio’s statute dictates that no employer shall fail to use
safeguards, or fail to adopt and use methods and processes
reasonably adequate to render a place of employment safe.144
Utilizing strong language, Ohio’s safe place statute goes on to
state that “no employer shall fail to do every other thing
reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety and welfare
of such employees or frequenters.”145 There is a compelling
argument to be made that Reliant Stadium has failed to do “every
other thing reasonably necessary” to safely maintain field
quality.146
The Ohio court in Vayto v. River Terminal & Railway
Company stated that the safe place statute was general and
declaratory, leaving to judicial determination the question of what
is a safe place or safe employment.147 The court went on to explain
that determining if employment was safe would “depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case and situation. A workshop,
factory, mine or other place of employment can, in the nature of

139. See Ex-Texans Punter Sues, supra note 4 (indicating that Hartmann
tore his ACL at Reliant Stadium on December 4, 2011 during a game against
the Atlanta Falcons).
140. See Ruppa, 91 Wis. 2d at 640 (reasoning that the field was not a profitmaking enterprise).
141. See Hoepner, 264 Wis. at 613 (holding that the municipal field was a
public building).
142. See id. at 611 (reasoning that the softball field was not a place of
employment because the city, in operating the field, was not engaged in any
industry, trade, or business, and its employees maintaining the field were not
employed for direct or indirect gain or profit).
143. See Ruppa, 91 Wis.2d at 639 (revealing that a place of employment as
defined by the safe place statute is any profit-making enterprise).
144. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.12 (2012) (listing the requirements of
the Ohio safe place statue).
145. Id.
146. See Panel, supra note 51 (describing how grass may be a safer
alternative because certain serious injuries occur more often on artificial turf
than on grass).
147. Vayto, 28 Ohio Dec. at 438.
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things, be made no safer than is reasonably consistent with the
practical operation of the business being there conducted.”148
Applying the reasoning of Vayto, Reliant Stadium could be
made safer while being “reasonably consistent with the practical
operation of the business.”149 Defendants SMG and HCCSC, in
operating their business, utilize grass trays at Reliant Stadium.150
Although Defendants had enough grass trays on hand to fill three
football fields, they failed to make the playing field safe on the day
Brett Hartmann was injured.151 Accounts of the condition of the
field on the day Hartmann was injured reveal that the surface had
even more indentations and lifted areas than usual.152 Some argue
that the surface was in a dismal condition because the field had
been used by high school football teams earlier in the week.153
Because the extra grass trays Reliant Stadium had on-hand were
not utilized, the dictates of Vayto were not followed because the
field at Reliant Stadium could have been made safer even while
keeping with their standard operating procedures.154
The safe place statutes clearly dictate that employers must
furnish safe employment.155 There is a strong argument to be
made that Reliant Stadium, as a place of employment, is in
violation of the statutes because its playing surface, which is
constructed from over 1,200 trays of sod, is unsafe for the playeremployees.156 Choosing artificial turf as an alternative to trays of
sod may not comply with the safe places statutes either because
studies suggest that artificial turf can be dangerous as well.157 In

148. Id.
149. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Request for Disclosures, supra note
5, at 4 (detailing that Reliant Stadium keeps a large number of extra grass
trays on hand in case trays become worn and need to be replaced).
150. See Ex-Texans Punter Sues, supra note 4 (describing how Reliant
Stadium piece together trays of grass to construct a playing surface for football
games).
151. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Request for Disclosures, supra note
5, at 4 (questioning why the extra grass trays on hand were not utilized to
replace pieces of sod which had been torn up due to activities earlier in the
week).
152. See Raley, supra note 3 (providing first-hand accounts that the Reliant
Stadium field surface was uneven).
153. See id. (giving players’ opinions that the Reliant Stadium field got
chopped up due to its use by high school teams earlier in the week).
154. See Vayto, 28 Ohio Dec. at 438 (reasoning that if a safety measure is
not unreasonable in light of a business’s standard operating procedure, then it
should be required under the safe place statute).
155. See WIS. STAT. § 101.11 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.12 (2012)
(directing employers to furnish safe places of employment to employees).
156. See Raley, supra note 3 (establishing that the field surface at Reliant
Stadium is composed of many squares of sod, or grass trays, which are
dangerous for players due to gaps and continuity problems).
157. See Panel, supra note 51 (studying serious knee and ankle injuries in
professional football players occurring on various playing surfaces including
natural grass and artificial playing surfaces).

134

The John Marshall Law Review

[47:115

fact, studies indicate that certain serious knee and ankle injuries
happen more often in games played on artificial turf than on
grass.158 Choosing natural grass would be safer than artificial turf
and is not unreasonable in light of the NFL’s business operations
in that many other stadiums have natural grass fields.159
Reliant Stadium’s current method of utilizing 1,200 trays of
sod is clearly unsafe and fails to comply with safe place statutes.
Having so many individual trays of sod creates innumerable
seams between pieces of sod and many potential hazards for
players.160 Compliance with the safe place statutes may be
achieved through installing a full-field piece of sod or natural
grass.161 By using a full-field piece of sod or natural grass, seams
would be avoided and players would face fewer hazards, thereby
creating a safer employment environment for professional football
players.
C. Open and Obvious Doctrine Will Not Abrogate Statutory Duties
A court will likely find that hazardous seams between pieces
of sod are not an open, unconcealed, or obvious hazard. The seams
are very different from swimming pools, steps, or ditches, which
courts have widely deemed open and obvious dangers.162 Seams
are more analogous to situations in which case law suggests a
defect is not an open and obvious danger.163 Seams are more akin
to the store shelf in Patterson v. Troyer Potato Products which was
protruding 3 or 4 inches near floor level where neither plaintiff nor

158. See id. (suggesting that FieldTurf, the most popular artificial playing
surface, had a higher rate of injury than natural grass surfaces).
159. See Vayto, 28 Ohio Dec. at 438 (reasoning that if a procedure is not
unreasonable in light of a business’s standard operations, then it should be
required under the safe place statute).
160. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Request for Disclosures, supra note
5, at 4 (detailing the method Reliant Stadium employs to create the playing
surface and asserting that this method creates an unsafe, uneven, and
unsuitable football field).
161. See Raley, supra note 3 (revealing that the surface at Reliant Stadium
is composed of trays of grass which are pieced together much like a puzzle,
often resulting in visible unevenness).
162. See generally Ex parte Industrial Distribution Services Warehouse,
Inc., 709 So.2d 16 (Ala. 1997) (stating that a premises owner is not liable for
injuries resulting from danger that was known to invitees or that invitees
should have observed through exercise of reasonable care); Prince v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 804 So.2d 1102 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (contending that no liability
can attach to an owner if the invitee possesses knowledge of the dangerous
condition); Ethyl Corp. v. Johnson, 345 Ark. 476, 49 S.W.3d 644 (2001)
(discussing the duty to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition and
to warn invitees of hidden dangers and the like); Wolford v. Ostenbridge, 861
So.2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003) (examining a property owner’s
duties to invitees).
163. See Patterson, 273 A.D.2d at 865 (holding that a defect near ground
level was not an open and obvious danger).
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anyone else noticed the shelf before it injured someone.164 In
Patterson, the Supreme Court of New York determined the shelf
was not open and obvious. Uneven seams are similar to the shelf
because they are neither on eye-level nor easily seen.165
Similarities can also be drawn between seams and a wet floor in
the laundry room of an apartment complex on a rainy day, which
resulted in the tenant injuring her knee.166 The Louisiana Court of
Appeals in Wallace v. Howell determined that the water on the
floor of the laundry room was not open and obvious.167 Uneven
seams are similar to the wet floor of the laundry room because
both are ground defects of which the victims did not have notice.168
If a court did find that the seams between grass trays at
Reliant Stadium are open and obvious, the open and obvious
doctrine would be a defense for the NFL, and the League could not
be held liable for Hartmann’s injury because a person assumes the
risk of injury from open and obvious dangers.169 “[K]nowledge of
the condition removes the sting of unreasonableness from any
danger” surrounding it, “and obviousness may be relied on to
supply knowledge [of the dangerous condition].”170 Hence the
obvious character of the condition is incompatible with negligence
in maintaining it.171 A plaintiff is barred from recovery when
injured by a dangerous condition if there is no negligence on the
part of the defendant.172 Therefore, the duty to keep premises in a
164. See id. (finding that neither of the employees present noticed the shelf).
165. See id. (reasoning that the store shelf was not an open and obvious
danger because it was nearly level with the ground and was not even noticed
by store employees).
166. See Wallace, 30 So.3d at 217 (finding that the accumulation of water in
the laundry room occurred on the floor and was not open and obvious).
167. See id. at 219 (reasoning that the apartment tenant had notice neither
that the laundry room leaked after heavy rain nor that the washing appliances
leaked).
168. See id. (explaining that the landlord of the apartment did not give the
apartment tenant any notice that water often accumulated on the floor of the
laundry room after heavy rain storms).
169. See generally Ernest H. Schopler, Modern status of the rule absolving a
possessor of land of liability to those coming thereon for harm caused by
dangerous physical conditions of which the injured party knew and realized the
risk, 35 A.L.R.3d 230 (discussing the modern status of the rule absolving a
possessor of land of liability for harm caused by dangerous conditions); James
L. Isham, Liability of local government entity for injury resulting from use of
outdoor playground equipment at municipally owned park or recreation area,
73 A.L.R.4th 496 (explaining liability for injury resulting from use of outdoor
playground equipment at municipally owned park or recreation area).
170. See HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 1491 (1st ed. 1956) (illustrating
how one can prove obviousness in the absence of proof that the plaintiff knew
of the danger).
171. See id. (contending it is unfair to hold a premises owner liable where
his negligence is less than the plaintiff’s negligence).
172. See id. (asserting that even if the plaintiff was careful, so long as the
danger was open and obvious, liability should not attach to the premises
owner).
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reasonably safe condition is abrogated where a dangerous
condition is open and obvious.173
Ultimately, the NFL has a duty to foresee and guard against
hazards and to protect the players under statutory law.174 While a
finding that the dangerous seams are an open and obvious danger
could abrogate this duty, a court is more likely to find that the
hazard was concealed because seams between pieces of sod are
unlike open and obvious dangers such as swimming pools, steps,
and ditches in that they are not large, noticeable hazards.175
D. Impact on NFL
The NFL could continue to face litigation due to poor field
quality. Field quality is not something that is explicitly outlined in
the CBA.176 Article 3 of the CBA bars lawsuits for conduct which is
permitted by the agreement.177 Because neither field quality nor
field maintenance is discussed in the CBA, players may sue for
injuries resulting from field quality issues.178 Litigation can be
very costly for a business.179 For this reason, the NFL may be
interested in negotiating a solution to avoid litigation over field
quality.180
Additionally, because field quality is not explicitly discussed
in the CBA, the NFL may wish to add provisions to the CBA so as
to limit future lawsuits.181 In order to change the terms and

173. See Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio St. 2d 45, 48 (Ohio 1968) (reasoning
that no liability should attach to the owner of the premises where a danger is
open and obvious).
174. See WIS. STAT. § 101.11 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.12 (2012)
(mandating that employers furnish safe places of employment to all of their
employees).
175. See generally Ex parte Industrial Distribution Services Warehouse,
Inc., 709 So.2d 16 (holding that a premises owner is not liable for injuries
resulting from an open and obvious danger), Prince, 804 So.2d 1102 (asserting
that no liability can attach to an owner where the danger known), Ethyl Corp.,
345 Ark. 476 (discussing the duty to maintain premises in a reasonably safe
condition and to warn invitees of hidden dangers and the like).
176. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30
(lacking any terms or clauses in the agreement which dictate standards for
field quality or mandated playing surfaces).
177. See id. at art. 3, § 2 (detailing the types of lawsuits which the NFL and
the NFLPA have agreed not to lodge against one another).
178. See generally id. (lacking any provisions regarding field quality or field
maintenance).
179. See Litigation Cost Survey, supra note 18(attesting that litigation
constitutes a significant economic cost of doing business); Belson, supra note
18 (expressing that the legal bills the NFL is facing are draining the insurance
companies who wrote polices for the NFL).
180. See Litigation Cost Survey, supra note 18 (explaining that litigation
can be very costly); Belson, supra note 18 (stating that the expense of the legal
ramifications of concussion litigation may be more than the NFL’s insurers are
equipped to absorb).
181. See id. (contending insurers may start raising premiums or excluding
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conditions of the CBA, the NFL and NFLPA must mutually assent
to those changes.182 However, the current CBA is controlling until
2020, and absent other incentives, players’ representatives may
have little motivation to renegotiate the terms of the CBA
prematurely because doing so could limit players’ potential
recovery for injuries sustained due to poor field quality.183
Field quality litigation and concerns surrounding playing
surfaces could lead to possible rule changes.184 The NFL Game
Operations Manual currently lists certain guidelines that clubs
must follow pertaining to field quality.185 Clubs must certify that
fields are in compliance with the guidelines and have passed an
impact hardness test, synthetic infill depth and evenness test, and
a visual inspection.186 An impact hardness test is used to assess
the safety and playability of a playing surface.187 The synthetic
infill test is designed to ensure that turf is not too short or too long
so as to impede game play. Finally, the visual inspection is meant
to ensure that the playing surface is free of any defects or foreign
objects.188
The manual states that for home games, clubs are responsible
for having staff maintain the field and respond to any playing
surface issues, but a single sentence in a guideline book is unlikely
to absolve the NFL of all responsibility for injuries players sustain
due to poor field quality.189 While it is laudable for the NFL to
concussions and other injuries from the policies they write for the NFL).
182. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30, at 5, art. 2,
§ 4 (expressing that the agreement cannot be modified unless both the NFL
and the NFLPA both agree to the modifications).
183. See id. at xiv (displaying the timeframe during which the agreement is
binding upon the NFL and the NFLPA).
184. See League, supra note 92 (remarking that the NFL released a new and
expanded statement on return-to-play rules for professional football players
who sustain a concussion in response to criticism for the way the League
handled players’ head injuries and rehabilitation schedules).
185. See Bell, supra note 47 (listing tests which field managers or staff of
each individual football club are required to conduct to be in compliance with
the Recommended Practices for the Maintenance of Infill and Natural
Surfaces for NFL Games).
186. See id. (mandating that individual football clubs are responsible for
addressing any playing surface issue and remedying the issue before any
gameplay ensues).
187. See G-max Testing - An Overview, SPORTS TURF SOLUTIONS,
http://www.turftest.com/gmax-overview.html (last visited on Jan. 29, 2013)
(calculating a ratio comparing the maximum acceleration experienced during
an impact, to the normal rate of acceleration due to gravity where the higher
the value, the poorer the performance of the surface); Bell, supra note 47
(listing the requirements of the impact hardness test which dictates that the
g-max must be less than one hundred g).
188. See id. (detailing the requirements of the synthetic infill test and visual
inspection which individual football clubs are responsible for conducting before
games).
189. See id. (explaining that the individual football clubs are responsible for
having their field managers or staff address any playing surface issues and
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have taken the first steps to regulate playing surfaces for the
safety of its players, the guidelines set out in the NFL Game
Operations Manual do not go far enough.190 The NFL might
consider making playing surface guidelines stricter in response to
concerns over poor field quality.
Similarly, the NFL changed certain rules surrounding game
play in response to concerns over concussions.191 Unlike the rule
changes surrounding concussions which focus on making
individual plays safer, rule changes surrounding field quality
could take the form of a playing surface mandate.192 Currently,
studies indicate that the safest playing surface to mandate would
be full-field sod, or natural grass like the stadium in Glendale,
Arizona.193 Such a rule change would have significant
ramifications in the NFL because modeling playing surfaces after
the Arizona stadium could prove to be economically challenging for
some franchises.194 Nevertheless, many clubs could harness the
power of their desirable location to draw other tenants to a wellmaintained multi-use facility.195
In the long-run, making game play safer for professional
football players could prove profitable for the NFL.196 By making
the game safer, players would sustain fewer injuries, which would
amount to fewer potential lawsuits for the NFL to defend.197 From
the start of training camp through the Super Bowl game, there
was an increase of 1,302 total injuries reported during the 2011
season, bringing the 2010 total of 3,191 up to 4,493.198 Fewer

remedying such issues before gameplay).
190. See id. (providing only three tests for a playing surface and largely
making clubs responsible for their implementation).
191. See League, supra note 92 (publishing a new and expanded statement
on return-to-play rules for players who sustain a concussion after the NFL
received wide criticism for how the League handled concussions and player
safety issues).
192. See Kacsmar, supra note 9 (illustrating how the kickoff rule change,
which moved the kickoff up five yards from the thirty-yard line to the thirtyfive-yard line, led to fewer collisions and fewer concussions).
OF
PHOENIX
STADIUM,
193. See
Statistics,
UNIVERSITY
http://www.universityofphoenixstadium.com/stadium/statistics (last visited
Jan. 27, 2013) (explaining that the stadium uses full-field grass).
194. See id. (denoting the number and amount of investments that were
necessary to construct the University of Phoenix Stadium in Glendale,
Arizona).
195. See id. (listing the various events that can be hosted by the University
of Phoenix Stadium in Glendale, Arizona).
196. See Kacsmar, supra note 9 (asserting that keeping the number of
injuries professional football players sustain to a minimum is imperative for
the long-term future and viability of the NFL).
197. See id. (describing how certain injuries, such as head trauma and
permanent brain damage, have led some professional football players to file
actions against both the NFL and individual teams to recover medical
expenses, rehabilitation expenses, and lost future wages).
198. See id. (providing a detailed breakdown of the total number of injuries
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injuries could mean fewer costly medical tests, surgeries, and
rehabilitations. Overall, the League could save money from having
fewer legal and medical expenses by making game play safer
through improved field quality.199
IV. MAKING THE PLAYBOOK: CONCUSSION LITIGATION
IMPLIES THE NFL MUST PROTECT PLAYERS FROM
UNSAFE TURF
A. Implications from Concussion Litigation
Much like how concussion litigation led to expanded
regulations, field quality litigation could very well lead to the
League announcing new regulations to keep players safe.200 The
concussion litigation revolves around the idea that once the NFL
became aware of how dangerous concussions could be to players,
the NFL should have warned players of the long-term health
effects of concussions and taken affirmative steps to protect
them.201 The NFL eventually adopted new rules and regulations to
mitigate the danger of concussions by trying to make every play
safer.202 However, the League was widely criticized for not taking
action sooner to protect professional football players.203 Some even
insinuated that the NFL tried to minimize or hide the true
dangers of concussions.204 The Complaint filed on behalf of over
3,000 current and former players who sustained concussions
alleges that the NFL misled the plaintiffs and “willfully and
intentionally concealed from them the heightened risk or
neurodegenerative disorders and concealed from then-current NFL
players and former NFL players the risks of head injuries in NFL
games and practices, including the risks associated with returning
sustained by professional football players by season and severity).
199. See Belson, supra note 18 (showing that the NFL’s legal expenses are
extremely costly and have had a huge effect on insurance companies who
wrote policies for the NFL, forcing some insurance companies into mergers or
bankruptcy).
200. See League, supra note 92 (disclosing how the danger associated with
repeated concussions led the NFL to change certain rules, such as return-toplay rules).
201. See Bedi, supra note 13 (explaining that once the NFL became aware of
the dangers of concussions through research conducted by the Mild Traumatic
Brain Injury Committee, an affirmative duty developed such that required the
NFL to warn the players of the long-term effects of repeated concussions).
202. See League, supra note 92. See also, Heitner, supra note 97 (discussing
the current concussion litigation the NFL is facing as a result of how the NFL
handled players’ recovery from head trauma).
203. See NFL Scolded, supra note 95 (expressing how the House Judiciary
Committee, with lawmakers, former players, and former team executives
accused the NFL of neglect in its treatment of active and retired players with
brain injuries).
204. See id. (quoting Representative Linda T. Sánchez, Democrat of
California as drawing similarities between the NFL and the tobacco industry).
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to physical activity too soon after sustaining a sub-concussive or
concussive injury.”205
Field quality litigation could mirror concussion litigation.
Now that the NFL is aware that field surfaces can be very
dangerous for football players, they must act to make conditions
safe for their employees.206 Seams between pieces of sod have
proven to be dangerous because players’ feet can get caught,
causing extensive knee and ankle injuries.207 There is also
evidence that artificial turf can increase the number of knee and
ankle injuries among football players.208 The NFL should now take
proactive steps to remedy dangerous playing surfaces because if
the NFL does not do something in an effort to protect players, the
League could again be criticized for denying that a problem exists
or trying to minimize the issue.209 The chosen remedy may be less
important than the act itself, for it would seem that the worst
action for the NFL to take is no action at all.
Based upon how the NFL handled concussion litigation, the
League may deny that field quality is an issue and downplay the
dangers of certain playing surfaces.210 In an effort to avoid
mandating a playing surface, the NFL may argue that the
disputes surrounding field quality fall under the existing collective
bargaining agreement covering injury grievances, and therefore,
the clauses within the CBA should control.211 The NFL may cite to
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act which governs
all CBA’s affecting interstate commerce and argue that all statelaw claims are preempted.212 Field quality litigation would have to
maneuver around the existing CBA to be successful.213 Because
205. Heitner, supra note 97.
206. See Ex-Texans Punter Sues, supra note 4 (explaining that former
Texans punter Brett Hartmann fractured his bone and tore his ACL after his
foot got caught in a seam in the playing surface at Reliant Stadium).
207. See Raley, supra note 3 (stating that punter Brett Hartmann was
injured when his foot was caught between the seams of two pieces of sod).
208. See Panel, supra note 51 (suggesting that certain serious knee and
ankle injuries happen more often in games played on FieldTurf, the most
popular brand of artificial turf, than on grass).
209. See NFL Scolded, supra note 95 (providing criticism from the House
Judiciary Committee, lawmakers, former players, and former team executive
accusing the League of neglect in its handling of active and retired players
with brain injuries).
210. See id. (demonstrating that the NFL provided vague answers when
questioned by Congress).
211. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30
(representing the agreement between the NFL and the NFLPA on a wide
variety of topics such as injuries, lawsuits, and grievances).
212. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (declaring it to be the U.S. policy to eliminate
certain obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate these
obstacles by encouraging collective bargaining).
213. See Bedi, supra note 13 (observing that in the course of the current
concussion litigation the NFL has attempted to argue that negligence actions
should be dismissed because the CBA is a binding contract which should
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field quality is not explicitly outlined in the collective bargaining
agreement, a court should find that the CBA does not block field
quality litigation.214
The NFL should avoid downplaying the dangers of playing
surfaces and attempting to thwart field quality litigation with the
Labor Relations Management Act. “Punting” the issue in this
fashion could be viewed as attempting to conceal hazards faced by
professional football players.215 Public opinion of the NFL has
declined as of late due to various circumstances, including the
League’s treatment of concussions and the veteran referee
lockout.216 Another hit to the NFL’s image could cause irreparable
damage at a time when the League is attempting to expand into
new markets, both domestically and internationally.217
B. Say No to Artificial Turf and Yes to the Arizona Model
Because studies have found artificial turf to be more
dangerous than natural grass, stadiums should avoid using it so
that game play can be made safer.218 According to player surveys,
nearly ninety percent of players believe artificial turf causes more
soreness and fatigue and is more likely to shorten their careers.219
Nearly eighty-two percent of players believe that artificial turf is
more likely to contribute to injuries than grass.220 Players have
strong opinions on field quality and field performance, and because
they must play on fields day in and day out as a condition of their
control).
214. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 30
(lacking any terms or clauses which relate to a standard for playing surfaces
or any procedure for remedying poor field quality).
215. See NFL Scolded, supra note 95 (describing how the NFL minimized
the dangers players faced from repeated concussions).
216. See Jason Maloni, How the NFL Was Forced into Fourth and Long,
LEVICK, Sept. 27, 2012, http://levick.com/blog/2012/09/27/how-nfl-was-forcedfourth-and-long#.UQXRBL_hqNI (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (opining that
certain actions and communications missteps, such as the veteran referee
lockout, caused public opinion to turn against the League because the NFL
remained silent on the issue).
217. See Kaplan, supra note 17 (acknowledging that the NFL aims to reach
$25 billion in revenue by 2027 and commenting that while the domestic
market is quite saturated by the NFL, the international market holds yetuntapped potential growth).
218. See Panel, supra note 51 (finding that serious knee and ankle injuries
happen more often in games played on artificial turf, specifically the most
popular brand FieldTurf, than on natural grass surfaces).
219. See Player Survey Reveals Arizona, Indy Have Best Fields in NFL,
NFL,
Feb.
3,
2011,
http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/story/09000d5d81e1a8d0/article/plapla-surveyreveals-arizona-indy-have-best-fields-in-nfl (last visited Jan. 25, 2013)
[hereinafter Player Survey] (providing viewpoints of current players on their
favorite and least favorite playing surfaces).
220. See id. (providing professional football players’ viewpoints on both
grass and artificial playing surfaces).
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employment, their viewpoints should be held in high regard.
Surveys conducted by the players’ union show that players
overwhelmingly prefer grass fields, and they have repeatedly
named Arizona’s grass field as the best in the League.221 According
to these same player surveys, a vast majority of players believe
there should be a League-wide standard for all playing fields.222
New England Patriot’s Coach Bill Belichick has similarly called for
the League to ensure that every stadium has safe playing
surfaces.223 During a radio interview, Belichick stated,
[F]or the level of play we have in the National Football League, I
think consistency on the field would be priority number one. We talk
about players’ safety, about hits and all that and that’s certainly an
area that should always be addressed. There’s nothing more
important than player safety. To me, player safety starts on the
surface that we play on.224

The NFL should listen to what the players and coaches want
and give them a League-wide standard because by acquiescing to
the needs of the players, game play could be made safer through
improved field quality.225
The Arizona Cardinals’ stadium in Glendale, Arizona may
serve as a viable model for other clubs.226 The Cardinals play at
the University of Phoenix Stadium, which is a multipurpose
facility unlike any other in America.227 The primary tenants in the
stadium include the NFL’s Arizona Cardinals and the Annual
Tostitos Fiesta Bowl of the college football Bowl Championship
Series (BCS).228 The stadium has the ability to host football,
basketball, soccer, concerts, consumer shows, motorsports, rodeos,
and corporate events, providing the facility management group

221. See id. (naming the University of Phoenix Stadium as the best field in
the NFL).
222. See id. (stating that players are calling for League-wide mandated
playing surface).
223. See Florio, supra note 11 (providing New England Patriots’ head coach
Bill Belichick’s statements that the League needs to demand safe playing
surfaces in every stadium).
224. Id.
225. See id. (quoting New England Patriots’ head coach Bill Belichick
calling for improved field surfaces to protect the safety of players); Bell, supra
note 47 (explaining that the NFLPA monitors field quality issues and calls for
upgrades when a playing surface becomes a safety hazard to players, such as
the problematic playing surface at Washington Redskins’ FedEx Field).
226. See Statistics, supra note 193 (showing how various investments made
the University of Phoenix Stadium possible).
227. See Stadium History, UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX STADIUM,
http://www.universityofphoenixstadium.com/stadium (last visited Jan. 27,
2013) (explaining how the University of Phoenix Stadium is capable of hosting
a wide variety of events).
228. See id. (naming the primary clients and other events the University of
Phoenix Stadium hosts).
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ample opportunity to profit.229 By diversifying the client base, the
facility has many avenues from which to raise revenue, and
accordingly many ways to fund maintenance of the facility.230
The field surface at University of Phoenix Stadium is the first
of its kind in North America in that the grass field rolls out of the
stadium on an 18.9 million pound tray, residing outside of the
stadium except for football and soccer events when it is drawn
back into the stadium.231 By remaining outside, the grass playing
surface gets the maximum amount of sunshine and nourishment,
eliminating humidity problems inside the stadium and providing
unrestricted access to the stadium floor for events and staging.232
By having a retractable field, fewer problems result from using the
facility for multiple purposes because the field sustains less wear
and tear, which player surveys have indicated is important, citing
the multi-use of a facility as the largest contributor to poor field
quality.233
Additionally, building a multi-use facility like the University
of Phoenix Stadium allows a management group to solicit funding
from a wider audience when seeking to build a stadium and to
raise revenue from a wider array of events.234 When and if at all
possible, clubs should strive to model their franchise after the
Arizona model.
If clubs are unable to follow the Arizona model, they should,
at a minimum, ensure that the playing surface is as safe as
possible. Studies show that artificial turf can be very dangerous.235
The best option as far as player safety is concerned would be to
mandate that all fields must have full-field grass playing
surfaces.236 While this mandate may seem economically
challenging for some franchises because of expenses associated
with installing and maintaining grass fields, the long-term

229. See Statistics, supra note 193 (listing a variety of events the University
of Phoenix Stadium is capable of hosting).
230. See id. (discussing the investment and client base which helped fund
the University of Phoenix Stadium and made its construction possible).
231. See id. (summarizing how the playing surface at the University of
Phoenix Stadium is transported in and out of the stadium as needed).
232. See id. (illustrating the ease with which the grass playing surface can
be maintained when it is transported outside of the University of Phoenix
Stadium).
233. See id. (indicating that the only events to use the grass playing surface
at the University of Phoenix Stadium are professional football and professor
soccer); Player Survey, supra note 219 (providing player viewpoints that multiuse facilities are often not maintained properly and have poor field quality)
234. See Statistics, supra note 193 (indicating that the University of
Phoenix Stadium is capable of hosting a wide variety of events).
235. See Panel, supra note 51 (detailing studies suggesting that certain
serious knee and ankle injuries occur more often on artificial turf than on
natural grass).
236. See id. (stating that artificial turf causes players to sustain more
injuries than natural grass).
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benefits, such as the decrease in injuries players sustain, could
end up saving clubs a great deal of money.237 At the very least,
efforts should be made to keep natural grass in stadiums and to
increase safety through regulations such as banning grass trays
like those used in Reliant Stadium. Banning grass trays would
stop errant seams from ending a player’s career and would be one
small step on the path to improving player safety.
V. CONCLUSION
Injuries will unfortunately always be a part of professional
football, but the NFL has a duty to do what they can to provide
safe working conditions. Statutory law protects professional
football players, ensuring that employers furnish safe working
environments to employees. Neither the open and obvious doctrine
nor the NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement block field quality
litigation. While injuries and the process for handling injury
claims are outlined extensively in the CBA, field quality issues are
nowhere explicitly delineated in the agreement. Because of this
silence on the issue of field quality, the courtroom is a proper
venue for field quality litigation.
While the NFL has guidelines in place to promote safe
playing surfaces, current regulations do not go far enough to
ensure player safety. If the NFL does not take action now to
protect players from hazards caused by poor field quality, the
League could face legal challenges and waning public opinion.
Knowing the dangers associated with various playing surfaces, the
NFL should mandate full-field sod or natural grass as the required
playing surface.

237. See Statistics, supra note 193 (estimating the amount of the
investments that were necessary to construct the University of Phoenix
Stadium); Litigation Cost Survey, supra note 18 (explaining that litigation
constitutes a significant economic cost of doing business); Belson, supra note
18 (stating the legal bills the NFL incurs from player injuries are very costly).

